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Abstract
This paper presents necessary conditions for segregation of the popula-
tion in multi-community models with housing markets and heterogeneous
households. The conditions for the sorting of the population according to
income classes or other dimensions of heterogeneity are established without
explicitly describing the household utility function and budget constraint.
They therefore apply to a broad class of models, including models with
income taxation and property taxation. The segregation conditions in the
existing literature are surveyed using a common framework and a series of
new and less specific models are proposed. The analysis suggests that in
models with income taxation, segregation can often only be established un-
der very specific assumptions on the household’s preferences. Furthermore,
segregation cannot be ensured with progressive or regressive tax schemes.
Key Words: Income Segregation, Fiscal Federalism, Income Taxation,
Local Public Goods
JEL-classification: H71, H73, R13
∗The term ‘stratification’ has been replaced by ‘segregation’ in the course of revision.
‡I thank Klaus Neusser for helpful comments and his mathematical expertise.
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, there has been ongoing research on multi-community
models of urban agglomerations with heterogeneous agents. Multi-community
models try to explain persistent differences in local tax levels and in the provision
of local public goods in metropolitan systems of communities. A main finding
of the literature is that these differences are accompanied by segregation of the
population into groups with similar incomes and tastes. This paper establishes
the general conditions that induce such a self-sorting process of the population.
The study of multi-community models originates in Tiebout’s (1956) seminal
work. While Tiebout was seeking to determine the optimal number of jurisdic-
tions, positive theories of community systems take the political landscape, i.e.
the number of jurisdictions and their physical size, as given. This strand of lit-
erature builds on Westhoff (1977), who analyzed a general equilibrium model
with heterogeneous agents and a fixed number of competing jurisdictions. The
individual communities provide a local public good which is financed by a pro-
portional local income tax. The residents of a community agree on the tax rate
and on the amount of public goods in a majority vote that respects the commu-
nity’s budget balance. Households choose the community that offers them the
best combination of public goods provision and tax rate.
The consideration of local housing markets by Ellickson (1971) and Rose-
Ackerman (1979) was a major step towards more realistic models of jurisdictional
systems. This extension was accompanied by a shift away from the study of
models with income taxation to models with property taxation. The shift was
coherent with the U.S. institutional reality, but also a way to circumvent the
technical problems associated with the housing market in income tax models.
Property tax models have subsequently been investigated by Epple, Filimon and
Romer (1984, 1993) and Epple and Romer (1991). This strand of literature has
been comprehensively reviewed by Ross and Yinger (1999). The consideration of
further dimensions of household heterogeneity by Epple and Platt (1998) allowed
an empirical examination as undertaken by Epple and Sieg (1999) and Epple,
Romer and Sieg (2001). There are only very few studies of models with local
income taxation and housing markets, rare examples are Goodspeed (1989) and
Hansen and Kessler (2001a). Besides posing a theoretically interesting problem,
local income taxation exists in metropolitan areas in Switzerland.
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The segregation hypothesis is the central proposition in multi-community mod-
els with heterogeneous households. Endogenous segregation means that different
people choose different communities when the communities differ in tax rates,
housing prices and public goods provision. The population is then segregated
as groups of similar household attributes tend to live at the same places. While
the Tiebout model focuses on preference heterogeneity, Ellickson and Westhoff
turned the attention to income as the main dimension of difference.
Westhoff (1977) established income segregation by assuming that the relative
preference for the public good varies with income. Westhoff’s relative preference
assumption is equivalent to the Spence-Mirrlees, also called single crossing condi-
tion, of incentive theory and information economics. The mathematical analogy
is maintained in property tax models with a housing market. However, the same
strategy does not generally apply in income tax models with housing markets. In
Westhoff’s original model, households make their residence choice by comparing
a two-dimensional set of community characteristics, namely the public good and
the income tax rate. This two-dimensionality is maintained in the property tax
model, where households are only concerned with the after-tax housing price and
not with the tax rate per se. Unfortunately, this reduction of dimensionality is
only possible in very simplistic models with income taxation. Households have to
make a choice which takes account of the three dimensions of community charac-
teristics, namely the tax rates, the housing prices and the public goods provision.
This paper investigates the segregation conditions in this general setting.1
The first part of the present paper establishes a set of segregation conditions
formulated for a broad class of models, covering property tax models as well as
income tax models. The property tax models in the existing literature and the
few proposed income tax models can be treated as special cases of this general
setting. This framework allows to study a variety of new and less restrictive
income tax models. The second part of the paper presents a series of models and
shows how these models satisfy the conditions described in the previous section.
While in some models the proposed conditions are very naturally satisfied, one
has to make specific assumptions of household preferences in others. The main
1Note that the natural generalization of the single crossing condition to multi-dimensional
problems used in information economics cannot be adapted for the segregation condition. Gues-
nerie and Laffont(1984) describe how the single Spence-Mirrlees condition is adapted to a
multi-dimensional decision space in mechanism design problems.
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finding is that income segregation in income tax models can only be established
under very specific assumptions of household preferences. A further result is
that income segregation cannot be ensured with nonlinear, i.e. progressive or
regressive, tax schemes.
2 The Model
The model economy is divided into J distinct communities. The area is populated
by a continuum of heterogeneous households which differ in income y ∈ [y, y],
y > 0, y <∞. Income is distributed according to the density function f(y) > 0.
There are three goods in the economy: private consumption b, housing h and a
local publicly provided good g. The latter may be a pure public good, a publicly
provided consumption good or a pure transfer. It is local in the sense that it is
only consumed by the residents of a community.
A household can move costlessly and chooses the community that maximizes
its utility as place of residence. Each community j can individually set the
amount of the local public good gj and the local tax rate tj ∈ [0, 1]. This decision
is made in a majority vote by the residents who respect the budget balance in the
community. At this point it is not specified whether the tax is based on property
or income. Each community has a fixed amount of land Lj from which housing
stock is produced. Households may be renters or house owners. The price for
housing pj in community j is determined in a competitive housing market. The
private good is considered as the numeraire. A community j is fully characterised
by the triple (tj, pj, gj). The set of all possible community characteristics is given
by Γ = [0, 1]× IR++ × IR+.
2.1 Indirect utility
In the general framework, a household is described by its indirect utility function.
Section 3 shows how the indirect utility function is derived from different sets of
utility functions and household budget constraints. The indirect utility function
is a function on Γ× IR+ such that:
(t, p, g, y) → V (t, p, g, y) .
The indirect utility function is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable in
all its arguments everywhere on its domain.
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The following three assumptions on the form of the indirect utility function
are necessary conditions for segregation of the population in equilibrium.
Assumption 1 For all (t, p, g, y) ∈ Γ× IR+
Vt(t, p, g, y) :=
∂V
∂t
∣∣∣∣
t,p,g,y
< 0 ,
Vp(t, p, g, y) :=
∂V
∂p
∣∣∣∣
t,p,g,y
< 0 ,
Vg(t, p, g, y) :=
∂V
∂g
∣∣∣∣
t,p,g,y
> 0 .
Assumption 1 is the standard assumption about the influence of prices, taxes
and public goods on the household’s well-being. Property 1 follows directly from
applying Assumption 1 to the total differential of the indirect utility function.
Property 1 (Relative preferences)
For all (t, p, g, y) ∈ Γ× IR+
Mg,t(t, p, g, y) :=
dg
dt
∣∣∣∣
dV=0,dp=0
= −
Vt
Vg
> 0 ,
Mg,p(t, p, g, y) :=
dg
dp
∣∣∣∣
dV=0,dt=0
= −
Vp
Vg
> 0 ,
Mt,p(t, p, g, y) :=
dt
dp
∣∣∣∣
dV=0,dg=0
= −
Vp
Vt
< 0 .
Property 1 states that a household can be compensated for a tax increase either
by more public good provision or by lower housing prices. It also states that
a household is indifferent to higher housing prices if it is compensated by more
public good provision. M.,. is called the marginal rate of substitution between
two community characteristics. The marginal rates are well defined due to the
strict inequalities in Assumption 1.
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Assumption 2 (Constant sign of relative preferences)
At least one of the following three alternatives (a), (b) and (c) holds:
(a) For all (t, p, g, y) ∈ Γ× IR+ either
(CS+g,t)
∂Mg,t
∂y
> 0 or (CS−g,t)
∂Mg,t
∂y
< 0 .
(b) For all (t, p, g, y) ∈ Γ× IR+ either
(CS+g,p)
∂Mg,p
∂y
> 0 or (CS−g,p)
∂Mg,p
∂y
< 0 .
(c) For all (t, p, g, y) ∈ Γ× IR+ either
(CS+t,p)
∂Mt,p
∂y
> 0 or (CS−t,p)
∂Mt,p
∂y
< 0 .
Note that Mt,p = −Mg,p/Mg,t by definition and hence
∂Mt,p
∂y
= −
∂Mg,p/∂y ·Mg,t −Mg,p · ∂Mg,t/∂y
M2g,t
.
Assumption 2 states that the household’s relative preferences for community char-
acteristics change systematically with income. Alternative CS+g,t implies that a
rich household has to be compensated for a tax increase by strictly more public
goods than a poor household. Alternative CS+g,p supposes that the compensation
for higher housing prices by public goods strictly increases with income. Alter-
native CS+t,p means that the tax cut compensating for higher housing prices is
strictly more substantial for a rich household than for a poor household. The
alternatives CS−.,. are interpreted analogously. Assumption 2 requires specific
assumptions on the form of the utility function and/or the budget constraint.
In Section 3 several examples in which Assumption 2 is naturally satisfied are
presented.
Assumption 3 (Proportional shift of relative preferences)
One of the following two alternatives (a) and (b) holds:
(a) For all (t, p, g, y) ∈ Γ× IR+ either
∂Mg,t
∂y
= 0 or
∂Mg,p
∂y
= 0 or
∂Mt,p
∂y
= 0 .
(b) For all (t, p, g, y) ∈ Γ× IR+ both
∂Mg,p
∂y
/
∂Mg,t
∂y
and
∂Mt,p
∂y
/
∂Mt,g
∂y
with Mt,g = 1/Mg,t are independent of y.
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Assumption 3a is a very strong assumption. Assumption 3b is a weaker but
very technical. Both alternatives are difficult to interpret intuitively and seem
difficult to justify empirically. However, as will become clear in the next section,
Assumption 3 is an indispensable condition for the occurrence of segregation.
Assumption 2 and Assumption 3 are a three-dimensional generalization of the
single-crossing condition.
2.2 Location Choice
The indirect utility function V yields the utility of a household with income y in
a community j with income tax tj, housing prices pj and public good provision
gj. V implicitly describes the indifference surfaces in the (t, p, g) space.
A household with income y chooses the community which maximizes the
household’s utility. Hence, given a set of community characteristics, (tj, pj, gj)
for j = 1, ..., J , a household prefers community j over community i if and only if
V (tj, pj, gj, y) ≥ V (ti, pi, gi, y) for all i .
The graphical representation of the indirect utility function is extensively
used in the following proofs and therefore introduced in detail. Figure 1 displays
the indirect utility function graphically. The left picture in Figure 1 shows an
indifference surface in the 3-dimensional (t, p, g) space. Point 1 represents a
community with income tax t1, housing price p1 and public good provision g1.
The indifference surface V¯1,y := {(t, p, g) : V (t, p, g, y) = V (t1, p1, g1, y)} covers
all community characteristics that yield the same utility as community 1 for a
household with income y. Community 2 with (t2, p2, g2) is an example of such a
community. All triples above the indifference curves are preferred to community
1. As stated in Property 1, the indifference is increasing in p and in t.
The right picture in Figure 1 is an illustration of the same indifference surface
in the 2-dimensional (t, g) policy space for a given level of housing prices p.
Suppose for the moment that housing prices are fixed at p1. The solid curve
covers the set V¯1,y,p1 := {(t, g) : V (t, p1, g, y) = V (t1, p1, g1, y)} and corresponds
to the solid subset of V¯1,y in the left picture. The solid curve represents all
community characteristics that yield the same utility as community 1 given p1.
Consider now a different housing price level p2. All community characteristics
considered to be indifferent to community 1 given the new price p2 are on the
7
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Figure 1: Indifference surface in the policy space.
dashed curve. Community 2 with (t2, p2, g2) is an example of such a community.
The dashed curve lies above the bold line when Property 1 holds. Note that the
indifference surface depends on the household’s income y.
In the following propositions, the allocation of the households across distinct
communities induced by the conditions in Assumptions 2 and 3 is discussed. A
first observation is that all households are indifferent between all communities
when the communities have identical community characteristics, i.e. (tj, pj) =
(ti, pi) for all j, i. In this case the households settle such that all communities
show the same income distribution. This situation is a possible equilibrium in
all the models presented in Section 3. In addition, it is always possible to think
of equilibria in which subsets of communities have identical characteristics, i.e.
(tj, pj) = (ti, pi) for some j, i. However, these equilibria may not be stable.
2 The
focus of this paper is on the empirically interesting case of equilibria where all
communities exhibit distinct characteristics.
2The notion of ‘stability’ in an intrinsically static model is rather peculiar. Nevertheless
equilibria in static multi-community models are often judged by their ‘dynamic’ behavior. In
this ad-hoc interpretation, an equilibrium is called ‘stable’ when the change of community
characteristics induced by the migration of ‘few’ households gives these households an incentive
to move back.
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Proposition 1 (Boundary indifference)
When Assumption 1 holds and a household with income y′ prefers to live in
community j and another household with income y′′ > y′ prefers to live in com-
munity i, then there exists a household with income yˆ, y′ ≤ yˆ ≤ y′′, which is
indifferent between the two communities: V (tj, pj, gj, yˆ) = V (ti, pi, gi, yˆ).
Proof: Let Vj(y) := V (tj, pj, gj, y) be a household’s utility in j and Vi(y) :=
V (ti, pi, gi, y) in i. The household with income y
′ prefers community j to i,
hence Vj(y
′) − Vi(y
′) ≥ 0. The opposite is true for a household with income y′′:
Vj(y
′′)− Vi(y
′′) ≤ 0. Vj(y)− Vi(y) is continuous in y since V is continuous in y.
The intermediate value theorem implies that there is at least one yˆ between y′
and y′′ s.t. Vj(yˆ)− Vi(yˆ) = 0. The existence of yˆ follows from f(y) > 0. 2
Proposition 1 states that for any pair of communities there is a ‘border’ house-
hold which is indifferent between the two.
Definition 1 (Perfect income segregation)
An allocation of households is called perfectly segregated by incomes if the J sets
Ij = {y : household with income y prefers community j} satisfy
• Ij is an interval for all j,
• Ij 6= Ø,
• Ij ∩ Ii = Ø for all j 6= i,
• I1 ∪ ... ∪ IJ = [y, y].
Definition 1 means that any community is populated by a single and distinct
income class.
Proposition 2 (Perfect income segregation)
When Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold and all J communities exhibit distinct char-
acteristics, (tj, pj, gj) 6= (ti, pi, gi) for all j 6= i, then the allocation of households
is perfectly segregated by incomes.
Proof: The proof proceeds in two steps. Firstly, income segregation is shown for
a pair of two communities. Secondly, the result is extended to more than two
communities.
(1) The proof refers to Figure 2. Consider two communities 1 and 2 and
assume CS+g,t. The figure shows the indifference surface in the (g, t) space for three
9
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Figure 2: Indifference curves in the (t, g) policy space.
different income levels y′ < yˆ < y′′ and two levels of housing prices p1 < p2. The
solid lines represent all (t, g) pairs indifferent to community 1, characterized by
(t1, p1, g1), given p1. The indifference curves are increasing in t (Property 1) and
become steeper as income rises (assumption CS+g,t). The dashed lines represent
all (t, g) pairs that are considered to be indifferent to community 1 given p2.
They are shifted to the left of the solid curves (Property 1) and intersect at the
same point (Assumption 3 and proof in Appendix A). Imagine now a community
2, characterized by (t2, p2, g2), which is considered as good as community 1 by
household yˆ. If the (t2, g2) lies to the left of the intersection, then all richer
households y > yˆ, e.g. y′′, prefer community 2 to community 1 and all poorer
households y < y, e.g. y′, prefer community 1. If (t2, g2) is on the right side of
the intersection the preference order is inverted. No segregation occurs in the
unlikely case that (t2, g2) is exactly the intersection. The analogous argument
holds for the other alternatives of Assumption 2.
(2) Suppose that the household allocation is not segregated: y′ as well as y′′
prefer community i, but y′′′ strictly prefers community j. Then it follows from
Proposition 1 that there is a yˆ, y′ ≤ yˆ < y′′′. (1) implies that y′′ > y′′′ > yˆ strictly
prefers j to i, which is a contradiction. 2
Figure 3 shows a situation in which Assumption 3 does not hold. One can
verify that the sketched indifference curves satisfy Assumption 2 (CS+g,t and also
CS+g,p and CS
+
t,p). However, there is a richer household y
′′ > yˆ that strictly prefers
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Figure 3: Indifference curves when Assumption 3 is not satisfied.
Ci and also a poorer household y
′′ > yˆ that strictly prefers Ci. This contradicts
Proposition 2 and shows that Assumption 3 is a necessary condition.
Note that very little can be said about the order of p, g and t across com-
munities given the assumptions made so far. As Figure 2 shows, it is possible
that rich people prefer the community with lower taxes or the one with higher
taxes, that they live in the community with more or less public goods and that
the rich communities have higher or lower housing prices. The properties of an
equilibrium - if it exists - depends on the details of a fully specified model.
2.3 Taste Heterogeneity
In the previous sections, the sorting of the population with respect to income
was discussed. There may be other sources of heterogeneity such as different
tastes for housing or for the publicly provided good. Abstracting from income
heterogeneity, one can use the above derived conditions and propositions for taste
heterogeneity by simply replacing the variable y by a taste parameter, e.g. α,
which satisfies all the assumptions respectively.
Combinations of income and taste heterogeneity result in more realistic mod-
els. Such models do not predict perfect segregation into income classes, but an
allocation where the average household income still differs across communities.
Models with both income and taste variation have been studied by Epple and
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Romer (1998), Epple and Sieg (1999), Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001), Kessler and
Lu¨lfesmann (1999) and Schmidheiny (2002b). These models form the basis for
empirical investigation.
3 A Survey of Models
This section presents a series of models and discusses the specific assumptions
under which these models lead to income segregation. The models are categorized
along three dimensions: the nature of the local tax, the character of the publicly
provided good and the form of the housing demand. The model properties are
analyzed in in the three-dimensional (t, p, g) space of the general framework.
Some models could also be examined in a two-dimensional characteristics space
with the proofs becoming more elegant. However, it is the aim of this paper to
show the specifics of the whole model setup that generates segregation.
Each model is illustrated by an example. The household utility in these
examples takes the form of a mixed CES/Stone-Geary function:
U(h, b, g) = [γgρ + (1− γ)w(h, b)ρ]1/ρ
with
w(h, b) = (h− βh)
α(b− βb)
1−α .
Appendix B explains the characteristics of this utility function and derives the
properties of the different models. There are two important features of the chosen
utility function. Firstly, it allows the public good to be a perfect substitute
(ρ = 1, σ →∞), a perfect complement (ρ→ −∞, σ = 1) or of any intermediate
degree of substitutability, which is measured by the elasticity of substitution
σ = 1/(1 − ρ). Secondly, the budget share of housing can change with income
and therefore the income elasticity can differ from unity.
Table 1 summarizes the parameters of the specified models and shows their
properties and predictions.
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3.1 Property Tax, Transfer and Elastic Housing Demand
Epple and Romer (1991) propose a model in which the local jurisdictions pay a
lump sum transfer g to their inhabitants.3 The transfer is financed by a propor-
tional property tax t on the consumption of housing. The individual households
choose their place of residence and their optimal consumption bundle of a com-
posite private good b and housing h. The household problem is
max
h,b
U(h, b) s.t. y + g ≥ p(1 + t)h+ b,
where p is the pre-tax price of housing. The rate of substitution between the
community variables p, g and t can now be derived under standard assumptions4
by applying the envelope theorem to the total differential of the indirect utility:
Mg,t = ph
∗ , Mg,p = (1 + t)h
∗ , Mt,p = −
1 + t
p
,
where h∗ = h(t, p, y) is the demand for housing. Assumptions CS+g,t and CS
+
g,p are
satisfied as long as housing demand is strictly increasing in income. Assumption 3
holds as Mt,p is independent of y.
5
From the point of view of a household a monetary transfer is equivalent to a
perfectly substitutable public good. Hence one can study transfers in the specified
example by assuming that σ →∞ . The corresponding properties are reported as
case [1] in Table 1. The example shows that the transfer g in the poor community,
i.e. the community populated by households from lower income classes, is higher
than in the rich community. The opposite can be stated for the after-tax price
of housing p(1 + t), yet there is no resulting order for the tax rate t itself.
Other than in the original proof the general framework allows to study the
effect of a nonlinear tax scheme. Consider that the property tax rate t · r consists
3Epple and Romer (1998) extend this model and allow for heterogeneous tastes. The utility
function depends on a household specific parameter α, which describes the taste for housing:
max
h,b
U(h, b, α) s.t. y + g ≥ p(1 + t)h+ b .
Conditional income segregation arises for any given taste. Conditional taste segregation for
a given income level is only established by explicitly making Assumption 2 in terms of α.
Assumption 3 in terms of α is satisfied by construction.
4The standard assumptions are the following: the utility function is increasing, continuous
and twice continuously differentiable in all its arguments.
5From a household’s viewpoint, a community is fully characterized by the transfer and the
after-tax housing price p(1 + t). Segregation could therefore also be analyzed in the two-
dimensional (g, p(1 + t)) space, which simplifies the proof of segregation.
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of a tax shifter t, set by the community, and an exogenous tax rate structure
r(h) which can depend on the consumed amount of housing h = h∗(y) and
consequently on income. In this case, Assumption 3a is not satisfied any longer
as Mt,p = −[r
−1(h∗) + t]p−1 depends on y. Thus, income segregation cannot be
established under a regressive or a progressive tax rate.
3.2 Property Tax, Public Good and Elastic Housing De-
mand
In the Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984, 1993) model, communities use the rev-
enue from a proportional property tax to finance a local public good.6 Differently
from above, the public good enters the utility function and not the budget con-
straint:
max
h,b
U(h, b, g) s.t. y ≥ p(1 + t)h+ b .
The marginal rates of substitution between community characteristics become
Mg,t = p h
∗
Ub(h
∗, b∗, g)
Ug(h∗, b∗, g)
, Mg,p = (1 + t)h
∗
Ub(h
∗, b∗, g)
Ug(h∗, b∗, g)
, Mt,p = −
1 + t
p
.
Epple et al. make an explicit restriction on the household’s preferences by as-
suming that ∂[h∗ Ub(h
∗, b∗, g)/Ug(h
∗, b∗, g)]/∂y < 0. This inequality guarantees
that Assumptions CS−g,t and CS
−
g,t are satisfied. Assumption 3a is fulfilled by
construction as Mt,p is independent of income.
7
The properties of different specifications of the example utility function are
presented as cases [2] to [5] in Table 1. The example reveals that assumption made
by Epple et al. is satisfied when the public good is either a complement (case [2])
or a substitute (case [4]). The order of community characteristics changes with
the nature of the public good: Rich households will choose the community with
high public good provision when they cannot easily substitute the public goods.
6Epple and Sieg (1999) extend this model and allow for heterogeneous tastes. The utility
function depends on a household specific parameter α, which describes the taste for housing:
max
h,b
U(h, b, g, α) s.t. y ≥ p(1 + t)h+ b .
Conditional income segregation arises for any given taste. Conditional taste segregation for a
given income level only occurs by explicitly making Assumption 2 in terms of α. Assumption 3
in terms of α is satisfied by construction.
7Again, this model could be studied in the (g, p(1 + t)) space.
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As in the previous section, income segregation cannot be established under a
nonlinear tax scheme.
3.3 Income Tax, Transfer and Inelastic Housing Demand
Hansen and Kessler (2001a) present a model in which a pure monetary transfer
is financed by a proportional local income tax. Hansen and Kessler assume that
every household consumes one unit of housing independently of its income. This is
a clearly unrealistic feature, but it allows a very elegant analysis.8 The household
problem is
max
b
U(h, b) s.t. y(1− t) + g ≥ p+ b .
The marginal rates of substitution between community characteristics are
Mg,t = y , Mg,p = 1 , Mt,p = −1/y .
Assumptions CS+g,t and CS
+
g,p are generically satisfied in this setup. Assump-
tion 3a is fulfilled since Mg,p is independent of y. Note, however, that the seg-
regation conditions are only satisfied due to the extremely specific nature of the
housing demand together with perfect substitutability of the public good.
Table 1 summarizes this model in case [6] and shows that poor households
prefer the community with high transfer and high taxes.
3.4 Income Tax, Transfer and Elastic Housing Demand
The following model is a generalization of the model in the previous section.
Housing demand is allowed to depend on income. The publicly provided good is
still considered a pure transfer.9 The household problem is
max
h,b
U(h, b) s.t. y(1− t) + g ≥ ph+ b .
The marginal rates of substitution between community characteristics are
Mg,t = y , Mg,p = h
∗ , Mt,p = −h
∗/y .
8The housing price p in a community can formally be considered a reduction of the transfer
g. This model can, therefore, easily be studied in the two-dimensional (t, g − p) space.
9The same model is discussed in an unpublished study by Calabrese (1990). Unlike in the
rest of the literature, Calabrese establishes the segregation conditions using restrictions from
the public choice mechanism within the community. This proceeding may offer alternative ways
to establish segregation conditions and deserves more attention.
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Other than in the above models, this model cannot be analyzed in a reduced
two-dimensional characteristics space. One can immediately see that assumption
CS+g,t is always satisfied and assumption CS
+
g,p is met when housing demand
is increasing in income. CSt,p is positive (negative) if the housing elasticity is
smaller (bigger) than 1 since ∂Mt,p/∂y = h
∗/y2[1− ∂h∗/∂y · y/h∗].
Assumption 3a is only fulfilled if housing demand h∗ is a linear function of
disposable income y(1− t) through the origin, i.e. the preferences are homothetic
and the income elasticity of housing is εh,y = 1 for all y. In this case Mt,p is
independent of y as h∗/y is a constant. Assumption 3b is satisfied if and only if
housing demand is linear in income but not necessarily through the origin. Given
this linearity (∂Mg,p/∂y)/(∂Mg,t/∂y) = ∂h
∗/∂y and (∂Mt,p/∂y)/(∂Mt,g/∂y) =
y∂h∗/∂y − h∗ are independent of y. Note that the assumption of linear housing
demand is a necessary condition for segregation of the population in this model
and not just a convenient simplification.
The example in Table 1 exemplifies the above reasoning in cases [7],[8] and
[9]. The segregation conditions are always satisfied as the Stone-Geary subutility
w(h, b) generically leads to a linear housing demand function. If the income
elasticity of housing is 1 (case [7]), then segregation is only driven by the nature of
the public good. Hence, poor households prefer communities with higher transfers
in this case.
Non-linear tax schemes are a main feature of a realistic income tax model.
Consider that the income tax rate t · r consists of a tax shifter t, set by the
community, and an exogenous tax rate structure r(y) which depends on income.
In this case, Assumptions 3a and 3b cannot be satisfied. Income segregation can
therefore not be ensured under the prevalent progressive income tax schemes.
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3.5 Income Tax, Public Good and Elastic Housing De-
mand
The attention is now turned to the most general model. Local jurisdictions
provide a local public good financed by a proportional tax on income.10 The
household problem is the following:
max
h,b
U(h, b, g) s.t. y(1− t) ≥ ph+ b .
The marginal rates of substitution between community characteristics are
Mg,t = y
Ub(h
∗, b∗, g)
Ug(h∗, b∗, g)
, Mg,p = h
∗
Ub(h
∗, b∗, g)
Ug(h∗, b∗, g)
, Mt,p = −
h∗
y
.
There are several sets of assumptions that generate segregation in this model.
The first assumption is to set the income elasticity of housing εh,y to unity for all
y. In this case, housing demand is a constant fraction of disposable income. As in
Section 3.4Mt,p is independent of y and Assumption 3a is fulfilled. Assumption 2a
and 2b are satisfied when ∂[h∗ Ub(h
∗, b∗, g)/Ug(h
∗, b∗, g)]/∂y is either > 0 or < 0.
With this set of assumptions the segregation of the population is fully driven by
the nature of the public good. This situation and its qualitative implications for
the equilibrium values are resumed in cases [10] to [12] in Table 1.
Another important source for segregation is the income elasticity of housing.
Assume that the elasticity of substitution between g and w(h, b) is exactly one.
Table 1 shows the model properties if the income elasticity of housing is below
unity in case[13] and if it is above unity in case [14]. Assumptions CS−g,t, CS
−
g,p,
and CS+t,p (case[13]), respectively CS
−
t,p (case[14]) as well as Assumption 3b are
satisfied without further assumptions.
If the public good is either a substitute or a complement (cases [15] and [16]),
the segregation conditions are only satisfied if the income elasticity of housing is
one. Although the utility function in case [15] satisfies CS−g,t, CS
−
g,p, and CS
+
t,p it
10This model has already been analyzed by Goodspeed(1989). The graphical proof of segra-
tion he provides in Goodspeed(1986) leads to Assumption 2 in this paper. However, he fails to
observe the importance of my Assumption 3. The Stone-Geary specification in the numerical
simulation
max
h,b
U(h, b, g) = (h− βh)
α(b− βb)
1−α(g − βg)
γ s.t. y(1− t) ≥ ph+ b
satisfies Assumption 3b by chance and thereby prevents the detection of the missing assumption.
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does fulfill neither Assumption 3a nor 3b. Therefore, given the specified utility
function, segregation can be established if it is driven by either only the nature
of the public good or by only the income elasticity of housing.
Note that segregation of the population cannot be established under a pro-
gressive or regressive income tax scheme as can easily be verified by looking at
the conditions for Assumption 3 in Appendix B.
4 Conclusions
This paper presents a general framework in which the segregation of the popula-
tion induced by local tax setting in multi-community models with heterogeneous
agents and housing markets can be analyzed. A set of conditions leading to
segregation of the households is derived. While these conditions are naturally
satisfied in property tax models, very restrictive assumptions on the household’s
preferences are needed in models with local income taxes.
The results in this paper can be used to build more realistic multi-community
models with local income taxation. Note that this paper does not investigate the
entire general equilibrium model. Multi-community models have to be closed by
specifying both the housing supply function and the public choice decision within
communities. The latter is usually modelled as a majority vote. Existence of the
equilibrium in the complete general equilibrium model is not generally guaran-
teed. Hansen and Kessler (2001b) show that segregation of the population is in
many cases incompatible with the majority voting equilibrium within countries
in models with local income taxation. Schmidheiny (2002) establishes equilibria
in a model with local income taxes, a partly substitutable public good and elastic
housing demand as outlined in Section 3.5.
The model class analyzed in this paper is designed to explain decentralized
public choice in metropolitan areas. For this purpose it is justifiable to consider
the households’ residence choice independent from the location of its members’
jobs. However, the disregard of the dependence of residence choice from the
availability of suitable jobs - and vice-versa - limits the usefulness of these models
for examining fiscal decentralization on the level of federal states or countries.
The consideration of the location choice of firms would be a major step towards
a better understanding of fiscal decentralization on a national scale.
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Table 1: Overview of model properties.
linear property tax linear income tax
Section 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
Case [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
Restrictions on model parameters
σw,g ∞ ≥ 1 = 1 ≤ 1 > 1 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ > 1 = 1 < 1 = 1 = 1 < 1 6= 1
βh n.r. ≤ 0 = 0 ≥ 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 6= 0
βb n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. = 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 6= 0
εh,yd n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. = 0 = 1 < 1 > 1 = 1 = 1 = 1 < 1 > 1 < 1 6= 1
Segregation conditions
∂Mg,t/∂y > 0 > 0 = 0 < 0 d.i. > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 d.i.
∂Mg,p/∂y > 0 > 0 = 0 < 0 d.i. = 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 d.i.
∂Mt,p/∂y = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 < 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 d.i.
Assumption 2 X X x X x X X X X X x X X X X x
Assumption 3 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X x x
Ordering of community characteristics in equilibrium
gpoor vs. grich > > = < - > > ≷ ≷ > = < ≷ ≷ - -
tpoor vs. trich ≷ ≷ = ≷ - > ≷ ≷ ≷ ≷ = ≷ ≷ ≷ - -
ppoor vs. prich ≷ ≷ = ≷ - ≷ ≷ ≷ ≷ ≷ = ≷ ≷ ≷ - -
ppoora.t. vs. p
rich
a.t. > > = < -
Notes: ”n.r.” indicates that no restrictions on the model parameter are made. ”d.i.” denotes that the sign depends on
income, ”X” that an assumption is satisfied and ”x” that an assumption is not satisfied. ”≷” means that the community
characteristics differ but that their order is not determined by the restrictions made, ”-” means that income segregation
cannot be established. g, t, ppoor/rich is the equilibrium public good provision, tax rate and housing price in the community
with poorer/richer households. pa.t. stands for the net off property tax price of housing.
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Appendix A
This appendix shows the role of Assumption 3 in the proof of Proposition 2.
Consider three households with given income levels y′ < yˆ < y′′. The utility
these households achieve in some community j with characteristics (tj, pj, gj) is
denoted by Vj(y
′), Vj(yˆ) and Vj(y
′′). The indifference surfaces associated with
their achieved utilities in community 1 are implicitly defined as
f(t, p, g; y′) = V (t, p, g, y′) − Vj(y
′) = 0 ,
f(t, p, g; yˆ) = V (t, p, g, yˆ) − Vj(yˆ) = 0 ,
f(t, p, g; y′′) = V (t, p, g, y′′) − Vj(y
′′) = 0 .
Note that F : Γ → IR3 defined by
F (t, p, g) =


f(t, p, g; y′)
f(t, p, g; yˆ)
f(t, p, g; y′′)


reaches (0, 0, 0)′ for (t, p, g) = (tj, pj, gj). Also note that F twice continuously
differentiable in all its arguments since this was assumed for the indirect utility
function. Given these definitions Assumption 3 can be stated in an alternative
formulation.
Assumption 3 (Proportional shift, alternative formulation)
The Jacobian of F
DF (t, p, g) =


Vt(t, p, g, y
′) Vp(t, p, g, y
′) Vg(t, p, g, y
′)
Vt(t, p, g, yˆ) Vp(t, p, g, yˆ) Vg(t, p, g, yˆ)
Vt(t, p, g, y
′′) Vp(t, p, g, y
′′) Vg(t, p, g, y
′′)


is of rank 2 for any (t, p, g) ∈ Γ and any triple of income levels y′ < yˆ < y′′ ∈ IR+.
Assumption 3 states that - in a neighborhood around (tj, pj, gj) and independent
of the income levels - all three indifference surfaces intersect in a common one-
dimensional curve. Note that they would intersect in single point in the case of
full rank. As Assumption 3 holds for any (t, p, g) and any income levels the above
argument extends to the whole interior of Γ.
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The link of the above assumption to the formulation in Section 2.1 is discussed
in the following. Note that the Jacobian cannot have rank 1 as the indifference
surfaces do not coincide due to Assumption 2. Hence Det(DF ) = 0 is a sufficient
and necessary condition for Assumption 3 to hold.
Firstly, Det(DF ) = 0 if two columns are proportional, i.e. either
Vt(t, p, g, y)/Vp(t, p, g, y) or Vt(t, p, g, y)/Vg(t, p, g, y) or Vg(t, p, g, y)/Vp(t, p, g, y)
is independent of y. This is equivalent to the formulation of Assumption 3a in
Section 2.1.
Secondly, Det(DF ) = 0 if one column can be expressed as a linear combination
of the other two. For this to hold, the equation system in λ1, λ2 ∈ IR
Vp(t, p, g, y
′) = λ1Vg(t, p, g, y
′) + λ2Vt(t, p, g, y
′)
Vp(t, p, g, yˆ) = λ1Vg(t, p, g, yˆ) + λ2Vt(t, p, g, yˆ)
Vp(t, p, g, y
′′) = λ1Vg(t, p, g, y
′′) + λ2Vt(t, p, g, y
′′)
must have a unique solution. Solving the first two rows yields:
λ1 =
Vp(yˆ)/Vt(yˆ)− Vp(y
′)/Vt(y
′)
Vg(yˆ)/Vt(yˆ)− Vg(y′)/Vt(y′)
=
Mt,p(yˆ)−Mt,p(y
′)
Mt,g(yˆ)−Mt,g(y′)
∼=
∂Mt,p/∂y
∂Mt,g/∂y
,
λ2 =
Vp(yˆ)/Vg(yˆ)− Vp(y
′)/Vg(y
′)
Vt(yˆ)/Vg(yˆ)− Vt(y′)/Vg(y′)
=
Mg,p(yˆ)−Mg,p(y
′)
Mg,t(yˆ)−Mg,t(y′)
∼=
∂Mg,p/∂y
∂Mg,t/∂y
,
λ1 and λ2 will also solve the third row if they are independent of the income levels
yˆ and y′. This is equivalent to the formulation of Assumption 3b in Section 2.1.
21
Appendix B
This Appendix shows the calculations for the specified mixed CES/Stone-Geary
model in Section 3. Case numbers [.] refer to Table 1.
The utility function of a household is given by
U(h, b, g) = [γgρ + (1− γ)w(h, b)ρ]1/ρ
and
w(h, b) = (h− βh)
α(b− βb)
1−α ,
where α, γ ∈ [0, 1] and ρ ∈ [−∞, 1]. w(h, b) is the subutility from housing and
the private good g. This specification assumes that the preferences are weakly
separable between the public good and the other two goods (h, b). The subutility
of h and b is of the Stone-Geary form (see for a discussion e.g. Deaton and
Muellbauer 1980). Although the parameters βh and βb can be interpreted as
subsistence quantities they need not be positive. For βh = βb = 0 the Stone-
Geary utility function reduces to a Cobb-Douglas function.
w can be interpreted as quantity index of non-public goods. The preference for
the public good and the non-public goods takes the CES form. σ = 1/(1− ρ) is
the elasticity of substitution between public and non-public goods. g and w are
called substitutes when σ > 1 and complements for σ < 1. The CES function
contains the Cobb-Douglas function (ρ = 0, σ = 1), perfect complementarity
(ρ = −∞, σ = 0) and perfect substitutability (ρ = 1, σ =∞) as special cases.
Property Tax
In the case of a linear property tax, the housing demand is
h∗(t, p, y) =
α[y − p(1 + t)βh − βb]
p(1 + t)
+ βh =
α(y − ys)
p(1 + t)
+ βh ,
where ys = p(1+ t)βh−βb are the minimal expenditures to reach the subsistence
level. Note that the housing demand is independent of g because of the weak
separability.
The marginal rates of substitution between the community characteristics are
Mg,t =
[αα(1− α)(1−α)p−α(1 + t)−α(y − ys)]
ρg1−ρ(1− γ)ph∗
γ(y − ys)
,
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Mg,p =
[αα(1− α)(1−α)p−α(1 + t)−α(y − ys)]
ρg1−ρ(1− γ)(1 + t)h∗
γ(y − ys)
,
Mt,p = −
1 + t
p
,
where h∗ = h∗(t, p, y). Note that Property 1 is satisfied as long as the income is
above subsistence level.
The segregation conditions of Assumption 2 are:
∂Mg,t
∂y
=
[αα(1− α)(1−α)p−α(1 + t)−α(y − ys)]
ρg1−ρ(1− γ)p(ρh∗ − βh)
γ(y − ys)2
,
∂Mg,p
∂y
=
[αα(1− α)(1−α)p−α(1 + t)−α(y − ys)]
ρg1−ρ(1− γ)(1 + t)(ρh∗ − βh)
γ(y − ys)2
,
∂Mt,p
∂y
= 0 .
The following relationships hold if all households can afford the subsistence level,
i.e y > ys and h
∗ ≥ βh:
∂Mg,t
∂y
,
∂Mg,p
∂y


> 0 if ρh∗ > βh cases [1], [2]
= 0 if ρh∗ = βh case [3]
< 0 if ρh∗ < βh case [4]
.
Note that Assumption 3a is naturally satisfied in the property tax model since
∂Mt,p
∂y
= 0 .
Income Tax
In the case of a linear income tax, the housing demand is
h∗(t, p, y) =
α[y(1− t)− pβh − βb]
p
+ βh =
α[y(1− t)− ys]
p
+ βh ,
where ys = pβh− βb are the minimal expenditures to reach the subsistence level.
Note that the housing demand is independent of g because of the assumed weak
separability.
The income elasticity of housing is
ε(t, p, y) =
∂h∗
∂y
y
h∗
=
αy(1 + t)
α[y(1 + t)− pβh − βb] + pβh
.
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Assuming that all households can afford more than the minimum required quan-
tities, e.g. y(1− t) > ys for all y, it follows
ε S 1 iif (1− α)pβh − αβb T 0 .
The marginal rates of substitution between the community characteristics are
Mg,t =
{αα(1− α)(1−α)p−α[y(1− t)− ys]}
ρg1−ρ(1− γ)y
γ[y(1− t)− ys]
,
Mg,p =
{αα(1− α)(1−α)p−α[y(1− t)− ys]}
ρg1−ρ(1− γ)h∗
γ[y(1− t)− ys]
,
Mt,p = −
h∗
y
and satisfy Property 1 as long as income is above subsistence level.
The segregation conditions of Assumption 2 are:
∂Mg,t
∂y
=
{αα(1− α)(1−α)p−α[y(1− t)− ys]}
ρg1−ρ(1− γ)[ρy(1− t)− ys]
γ[y(1− t)− ys]2
,
∂Mg,p
∂y
=
{αα(1− α)(1−α)p−α[y(1− t)− ys]}
ρg1−ρ(1− γ)(1− t)(ρh∗ − βh)
γ[y(1− t)− ys]2
,
∂Mt,p
∂y
=
(1− α)pβh − αβb
py2
.
The following relationships hold if all households can afford the subsistence level,
i.e y(1− t) > ys and h
∗ ≥ βh:
∂Mg,t
∂y


> 0 if ρy(1− t) > pβh + βb cases [6]-[10]
= 0 if ρy(1− t) = pβh + βb case [11]
< 0 if ρy(1− t) < pβh + βb cases [12]-[15]
,
∂Mg,p
∂y


> 0 if ρh∗ > βh cases [7]-[10]
= 0 if ρh∗ = βh cases [6],[11]
< 0 if ρh∗ < βh cases [12]-[15]
,
∂Mt,p
∂y


> 0 if ε < 1 cases [6],[8],[13],[15]
= 0 if ε = 1 cases [7],[10]-[12]
< 0 if ε > 1 cases [9],[14]
.
Case [6] is directly derived from section 3.3.
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Neither Assumption 3a nor 3b is generally satisfied since
∂Mg,p
∂y
/
∂Mg,t
∂y
=
(1− t)(ρh∗ − βh)
ρy(1− t)− ys
and
∂Mt,p
∂y
/
∂Mt,g
∂y
=
{αα(1− α)(1−α)p−α[y(1− t)− ys]}
ρg1−ρ(1− γ)[(1− α)pβh − αβb]
γp[ρy(1− t)− ys]
depend on income.
Assumption 3a is satisfied if ε = 1 (cases [7], [10], [11], [12]) since
∂Mt,p
∂y
= 0 ,
and if ρ = 1 and α = 0 (thus σ →∞ and ε = 0, case [6]) since
∂Mg,p
∂y
= 0 .
Assumption 3b is satisfied if ρ = 0 (σ = 1, cases [13], [14]) since
∂Mg,p
∂y
/
∂Mg,t
∂y
=
(1− t)βh
pβh + βb
,
∂Mt,p
∂y
/
∂Mt,g
∂y
=
[(1− α)pβh − αβb](1− γ)g
pγ(pβh + βb)
and if ρ = 1 (σ →∞, cases [8], [9]) since
∂Mg,p
∂y
/
∂Mg,t
∂y
=
(1− t)α
p
,
∂Mt,p
∂y
/
∂Mt,g
∂y
= −
[(1− α)pβh − αβb]α
α(1− α)(1−α)
p(1+α)
.
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